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Abstract This Nietzschesque “genealogy of morals” presents the Confucian virtue of xin
(trust and true) so basic to friendship as a civic virtue rooted among social equals. Among
non-equals, a servant has to prove his trustworthiness but not yet vice versa. The script 信
(xin) tells of living up to one’s words. Yanxing 言行 (speech and action) describes actively
keeping a verbal promise. The Agrarian school endorses xin as the primary virtue in its
utopia of virtual equals. It knew oral trust and had no use for written covenants. In debating
Mencius, Gaozi kept to that earlier primacy granted public speech as tied to one’s social
reputation. Mencius turned inward and elevated mind as the inner good of moral intent
instead. In the Doctrine of the Mean, inner xin would expand outward into becoming the
ultimate truth, the sincerity of Heaven and Earth. The essay ends on an aside on the case of
the Cretan Liar.
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Of the five human relationships in Confucian society, friendship is deemed fifth. Correlated
with friendship is the virtue of xin 信 (trust or truthfulness) (Lai 1996). This essay attempts
to review the classical history of this virtue. If Aristotle distinguishes history from poetry—
one is about “what happened” and the other is about “what could have happened based on
knowledge of the general principles on how humans behave”—then this history is informed
by poetry.
1 The Etymology of Xin: Homo Politicus et Symbolicus
The ideogram xin is made up of ren 人 (a human person) and yan 言 (speech). It paints this
picture of a person “standing by (his) words.” It is about promise keeping, or how yan
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communal life. We speak and we mean what we speck. It is about being truthful. To be
truthful means not to lie (not bear false witness). As such, it is both descriptive of reality or
what is true and prescriptive in working to bring about the true. So it is not surprising that it
covers both the initial act (giving one’s words) and its final completion (a promise well
kept). The Chinese could thus equate xin and cheng 誠, the pictogram for the latter being
“speech + completion.”
We find all that formulation in the Analects of Confucius. There the equation of yan and
xing, speech and deed, is presumed. Xin is not just actions matching prior promise. It is also
speech running ahead of itself and promoting its fulfillment. Therefore a person’s words
(yan) are his reputation (same word yan 言) and reputation is simply his having cultivated a
habit of keeping his words. A gentleman’s words are therefore gold. And the emperor’s
mouth is called the “golden mouth” because a king can never go back on his words, and
what he says (a royal decree) is “as well be done.” Trust is such a foundational virtue
though, as Arthur Waley has shown, all that is said about the Chinese gentleman, we find
also in the English language for describing the English gentleman. There too, a man is his
words or is only “as good as his words” such that his words (viz. his reputation) also
precede him wherever he goes. That is why a gentleman should always be very careful
about what issues forth from his mouth (Confucian saying), which, to quote the wit of
Oscar Wilde, is “the Importance of being Earnest” (Victorian dictum).
However, if that is the case—if the Chinese and the English gentleman are so alike—we
have a problem. What can I say about this virtue that would be unique to classical China?
Worse, what more can I say beyond what is said above that virtually exhausts all the
aphorisms on xin in the Analects? Some virtues (like “honesty”) are so self-explanatory (it
is the habit of “not lying”) and so transparent (society cannot be based “on a lie”) that after
a while, there seems to be little more we can say. (And xin is about honesty.) We will
however be taking a clue from Nietzsche whose genealogy of morals has shown how what
is obvious might not be. Virtue, he found, was once descriptive of Power such that
“nobility” was once tied to a “noble class,” which means that before the morals were
remade by a civil or civilian society, there was once a different set of values tied to an ethos
of a warrior elite. A genealogy of morals would need to uncover such a layer or layers of
ethical reformation. When applied to classical China, this would require us to likewise
deconstruct our common assumption about xin. Before it became a universal virtue
expected of all homo politicus, it too was specific to a class and a time.
Even the Analects preserves a faint memory of how xin, a virtue of the “son of lords,” was
not something accessible as easily to women and the “inferior people” (the servile class).1 In a
bold retrieval of the Ur-Text (The Original Analects) by Bruce and Taeko Brooks, the earliest
chapter (what is now chapter four) still remembered that warrior elite and its ethos (Brooks
and Brooks 1998). But by about the middle of the Analects (“middle Analects” for short, viz.
chapters 12, 13, and 2 as reconstructed by the Brooks; these are chapters compiled at Lu 魯
after Mencius had found success in Qi 齊) (Brooks and Brooks 1998), the discourse on xin as
related to “speech and deed” hit a peak and took an overly cautious turn. This coincided with
the rise of the scholar-official who had then good cause to be extra cautious about (any
inadvertent) speech that might jeopardize his career, now that as a stipend officer, he was
responsible for any performance not up to promise (see for example 2.13). In the later
chapters of the Analects, the discourse on yanxing 言行 even petered out.
1 Confucius found women and inferior people harder to teach. They are proverbially unreliable. In a personal
communication, Bruce Brooks noted that in China as in Greece, the distrust of slaves and women is not over
their genetic make-up but the limited world and range of knowledge they had.
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I cite the above work by the Brooks not to replicate their findings but to show how idea
about virtues does change. I will offer a different reading on why the middle Analects (or why
Mencius) aggravated the discourse on “speech and deed.” In retrieving the warrior ethos that
denied women and slaves easy access to xin, my intention is not to perpetuate that sexist and
elitist bias but rather to show how men at one time (and still now) do not speak to women or
slaves as equals (as “man to man”). Because the rule of “promise keeping” does not apply to
non-equals, a slave cannot take his master to court for a breach of promise.2 Virtues were not
universal, not until after Confucius enfranchised all men into being potential gentlemen
capable of being ren (humane, noble) and being obligated by xin to all alike.
2 The Syntax and Grammar of Zhongxin 忠信: Beyond Friends in High Places
We can catch that expansion of trustworthy humanity by considering a frequent compound of
xin with zhong 忠. Zhongxin as a single virtue appears throughout the Analects. Read
universally as an internalized virtue, it is as often translated “integrity and truthfulness.”
Commentators made much of the script zhong (integrity: “heart + middle”) so that it denotes a
“devotion” to task or performing at all times (to wit) “with all thy heart, soul, and might.” As
such, it needs no human object as “loyalty to so-and-so.” But before zhongxin became a
universal virtue, they were two virtues that were at once status-specific and asymmetrical. The
evolution from one to the other may be seen as following this progression: (a) zhongxin was
hierarchic before it became egalitarian; (b) it was part of a warrior ethos before it became (c) a
civilian virtue (Lai 1986) that is universal, until it (d) got absorbed into the Golden Rule of
zhongshu 忠恕. The sequence of shifts can be mapped with this diagram:
warrior zhongxin civilian zhongxin
most hierarchic (a) loyalty toward lord who
in turn placed trust on the
steward-servant
(c) integrity and truthfulness,
lateral not hierarchic, esp.
with like-class friends
+
(b) loyalty to a common
cause but deceit toward
the enemy is legitimate
(d) integrity and reciprocity as
universal Golden Rule in all
dyadic relationships
most dyadic
In (a), loyalty is that of a servant toward his lord; for his proven devotion, the lord then
entrusts him with a task, often a steward overseeing other servants. Evidence supporting this
comes from the expressions zhongchen 忠臣 for a loyal minister and xinpu 信僕 for a trusted
aide. The idea that a ruler should work to earn the trust (xin) of his people is an innovative idea
that appears in Analects 12.7 (in Brooks and Brooks 1998). But that could not be the norm
before, when kings (like Messiahs) came to rule and be served—not to slave or to serve. King
Wen 文 of Zhou might have xintian 信天 (the expression then meant being compliant to the
will of Heaven, shuntian 順天) as to win the “trust” of Heaven (be entrusted with the rule).3
2 The slave has no recourse if his master should go back on his words. That situation was changed only in
Roman society when some slaves rose into respectability through patronage.
3 Because the word xin was still being used, with its etymological root meaning of “trusting in the words of
men,” xintian youming 信天由命 meant just shuntian or compliance with Heaven and accepting one’s Fate. The
religious usage of xin as “having faith in” is supposed to appear for the first time in the Mingfolun 明佛論 (On
Illuminating the Buddhahood), a Buddhist treatise by the layman ZONG Bing 宗昺 in the early fifth century C.E.
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Indeed his virtuous reign served the people well. But it would take a Mencius to remake that
into a scenario of the Mandate of Heaven resting upon the approval of the people such that the
ruler would need his subject’s trust to rule. The innovation in Analects 12.7 probably took its
cue therefore from Mencius. If so, then it means that zhongxin was at one time tied to a status-
specific relation.4 At one time, syntax and grammar would disallow the expression “a loyal
king” (loyal to his task) or a “trusting populace” (approving such a king). This rule should not
be overplayed because of a situation in (b).
In a time of war, (b) the warrior elite was united behind—devoted to—a common cause.
In battle, the trust between the leader and the led had to be mutual. Under attack from the
enemy, a general and a private become comrade-in-arms utterly reliant (trusting) one
another. The same circumstance also means that trust cannot be universal. Even though the
noble leaders on both sides observed certain rules of honor (viz. you do not flog a captured
general, not even in WWII), it was also understood that the use of deceit was perfectly
legitimate (cf. the D-Day landing on the Normandy Beach). There was no reason to “trust”
one’s enemy. Things change when we move into (c).
In times of peace, (c) zhongxin can be remade into a civilian virtue, eventually becoming the
mark of “integrity and truthfulness” as noted above. That probably began with the warrior’s
camaraderie being replicated among friends or comrades-in-peace. For the Confucian
gentleman, that might translate into the fellowship of the literati in their new scholar-official
capacity and class. But a further extension of zhongxin could become what is now known as
zhongshu 忠恕, the so-called “one thread” running through all of Confucius’ teaching.
In (d), zhongshu became a universal virtue; it is the Golden Rule. Reciprocity meant then
“What one does not desire, do not inflict upon others.” Written as “alike + mind,” shu 恕 is
read now as “of like mind.” This reads like Mencius’ notion of ren as empathy. Mencius
probably inherited it from Confucius since the formula is found in the “early Analects.” But
he might also have inspired the lineage of Confucians at Lu to claim it as the “one thread”
in the “middle Analects” and thereafter.5
I hold the zhongshu formula suspect though and would suggest that it was a rewrite of
zhongxin. The reason for my so saying is that (1) shu was not a designate virtue before. Had
it been, the Neo-Mohists who took care to explain various moral terms would include this
word in their lexicon; they did not. Furthermore, (2) we do not find shu in any binominal
virtues other than zhongshu, nor does it appear in other lists of multiple virtues. More
fundamentally, shu as a verb means “to forgive; to show mercy; to excuse.” Although it has
been remade into the virtue of reciprocity, we still do keep a hierarchic use of the verb form.
It takes a superior to forgive a subordinate. So only a king can pardon or show mercy
(toward a subject). A son can feel sorry for his father. In his heart, he can even forgive
wrongs done by his father. But publicly, a son cannot (may not presume a superiority as to)
forgive his father; no such formal rite is available.6 Now King Tang湯might take on the sins
of his people and allow himself to be baked by the hot sun. In that prayer for rain, he might beg
Heaven’s forgiveness on behalf of his subjects. But kings did not ask forgiveness from
subjects any more than seek their approval to rule as king. Typically when a sorry father and a
4 See for example zhongxiao 忠孝, loyalty toward the ruler and filiality toward the parents; or xiaodi 孝悌,
serving the elderly above and taking care of the youngster below.
5 The golden rule of Analects 12.2 is identified as shu in Analects 15.23; the conjunction of zhongshu is
found in Analects 4.15. Brooks and Brooks put these after the Middle Analects (see Brooks and Brooks
1998: 137).
6 Wives can forgive husbands in tales of “a broken mirror being made whole again.” The man can kowtow
before the woman and ask for her forgiveness and reconciliation. But marriage is a contract; father-son
relationship is ascribed by inflexible rules of intransigent patriarchy.
260 Whalen Lai
wronged son (or other insoluble types of family grievances) need resolving, the parties do so
under the auspices of a higher authority that both would bow to. So “under the ancestor’s
shadow,” a spiritual medium (a pre-modern family therapist) is usually called in—they still do
in Taiwan—to divine the will of those departed but very much alive “higher-ups.” Those
“significant others” regularly then asked the bickering descendants to preserve family harmony
and make peace among themselves.
How did zhongxin get rewritten into zhongshu? A tentative hypothesis would be:
Because friends are more equal, they are more open to mutual criticism as well as
forgiveness. The shu reciprocity among friends was somehow generalized into zhongshu as
a new formula. The hierarchic sense that the superior shu the inferior however persisted. In
the Doctrine of the Mean 13.3, the Golden Rule is more often read by commentators as “not
doing to those below you what you do not desire to receive from those above you.” That
hierarchic sense is built into the verb “to do” which implies an action from someone above
to someone below. It connotes a generosity of spirit. That asymmetry attends the three
standard illustrations of what shu means: it is what a ruler would show to a subject, a father
to a son, an elder brother to a younger brother. I am not saying that shu was never intended
to be among equals; our genealogy of morals only seeks to recall its original, less equal,
inspiration.
3 The Semantics of Trust: The Paradigm Shifts of Speech, Name, and Mind
The virtue of xin was predicated on speech (yan), above all, personal speech, a promise
given one to one. That ethos of an oral lore (yanyu 言語: yan 言 for short) would in time be
challenged by an ethos based on a written culture of mingzi 名字 (name and script: but name
for short). Further down the road of history, an ethos of xinxing 心性 (mind and nature)
would try to rewrite the prior assumptions. We will lay out that historical sequence in the
next section. For the moment, we are interested in the contention that rose among these
three—speech, name, and mind—in the middle Analects and how that affected the
discourse on xin.
The middle chapters revived an interest, not just in “words and deeds,” but also in the
“rightness due names” (zhengming 正名: the rectification of names). That theory of names
in Analects 12.11 lists simply “ruler ruler, minister minister, father father, son son” (just
eight characters). This “teaching of names” recalls the project of the Duke of Zhou. The
Duke ended war and wrought a culture (wenhua 文化) of peace by “instituting rites and
music.” The rites helped formalize the feudal mingwei 名位, namely, title and rank,
relationships. Thereupon, a noble person (ren) is as he was prescribed by the rites. In that
golden age, performing up to ritual code (name) would bring about the “good society.” Or
so Confucius believed. Even as Zhou rule was in shambles, the Master hoped ardently to
restore that Zhou ideal with his formula of junjun chenchen, fufu zizi 君君臣臣父父子子
(12.11). The formula left out the feudal five ranks (wei 位) and basically reduced society to
the two “intrinsic and necessary good” of the family and the state. The Confucian scholars
soon hoped to mediate the two poles as the new officer class. I believe the theory can still
be defended as a viable virtue ethics. Namely, the state and the family are provable to be
intrinsic goods via negativa, i.e. by seeing how being orphaned or being stateless is not as
good. Thereupon, “ruler and subject, father and son” should work to further the common
good (“good for both”). This can be accomplished by observing the principle of
reciprocity—instead of abiding simply by the old feudal norms as Xunzi 荀子 would
(Lai 1990).
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Historically speaking, the ethos of name (impersonally prescribed status) undercut the
ethics of speech (personally committed word). That does not mean that they were
incompatible. In fact, precisely as the Zhou order based on “title and rank” collapsed, there
was a need to depend more on an ethics of interpersonal commitment based on a person’s
word alone. Because Mencius had rebuilt ethics on an inner “nature and mind,” the Lu
Confucians who compiled chapters 12, 13, and 2 of the Analects and were known to be
diehard ritualists committed to the “outer” form of the rites responded, in part, by restating
the primacy of the rightness due name.7 It was packaged in a dense formula to match the
Mencian idealist reduction.8 The “benevolent king” in Analects 12.7 who would forgo first
strong arms, then even food supply, before he would the trust (xin) of his people,
exemplifies another Lu emulation of the new style of discourse (see Brooks and Brooks
1998: 91).9
These middle chapters’ interest in yanxing might however be due to more than just the
Lu Confucians’ fear of the pressure due bureaucrats in office. Not that there was no reason
for them not to worry: the Lu Confucians were ritualists whose “song and dance” probably
could not function too well as administrators.10 But the yanxing debate had to have been
influenced by the debate between Mencius and Gaozi 告子 on the primacy of mind vs.
speech. Now Gaozi’s position on yan has unfortunately been distorted by the Mencian
reportage. The first thinker to come up with a theory of an “immovable mind,” Gaozi was
fashioning a moral integrity that would not be swayed by lesser considerations. The Zhou
rule based on “name” being severely weakened, Gaozi was looking to personal yan as a
new standard. A magistrate known for being just and impartial, Gaozi followed his own
dictum of “never letting the passions rule the mind.” That part Mencius had less trouble
with. But when Gaozi said “never letting the mind act contrary to speech,” Mencius could
easily dispute that. To Mencius, it is clear that the moral intention is primary and is
antecedent to the speaking thereof. Mencius would eventually find a Platonic solution: that
the good within his mind somehow resonates with a transcendental Good. That cosmic
resonance we do not see in Gaozi.
However, Gaozi was no less in a quest for a personal integrity based on “self-
sufficiency” and “imperturbability” (two stoic virtues), although his solution was more
Socratic than Platonic. Socrates lived and died for honor, trusting that one day Athens
would recognize that he was truthful in his philosophy and crown him with the honor due
him. Socrates did not ground the daemon that inspired him in some cosmic daemon, some
flood-like ether of Mencian righteousness. Now the word yan covers both the “honor” and
the “philosophy” (speech) that Socrates lived by. Likewise, to live by yan for Gaozi meant
“doing the right (i.e. the honorable) thing” and be known (in public acclaim) for doing so.
Yan here involves an objective standard (outer righteousness), a personal philosophy
(Gaozi’s formula itself), and a social reputation (this worldly honor). Yan is here no longer
the old yan that went with particular “promise keeping” at the heart of xin (trust). It is a
generalized yan (reputation) tied to personal integrity (yi 義, righteousness) that comes with
7 Note also that the (full) “rectification of name” thesis in Analects 13.3 (pushed to chapter 19 by the Brooks)
is Xunzi-esque. Mencius rectified, not name, but mind. He was for making sincere the intention.
8 “Singular formula” involves finding single-cause explanations for the evils of the world and then offering
equally singular solution. If lack of love causes war and harm, then love would bring peace and benefit. See
Lai 1995.
9 The proto-Legalist (Guanzi 管子) would stress arms and food. The Mohists would probably find love and
trust with no concern for a sufficient food supply a mite too idealistic.
10 First suggested by Herbert Fingarette (Fingarette 1972), this image of Confucius or rather the Lu
Confucians has been—almost unbelievably—confirmed by Robert Eno (Eno 1990).
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“doing the right thing.” In practice, it meant not being swayed by the mind’s inclination or
the instinct’s desires, as illustrated by him with the prospect of enjoying a good meal. The
instincts would grab the food for oneself; that would make the self happy. The mind (by
which he meant the natural feeling of kin) would have the person deferring his own
gratification by first helping his younger brother to his meal first; this would make the child
happy. However, social etiquette would have us offer the first bite of food to the most
elderly member (a non-kin) at a village feast; we do that for his enjoyment. That being the
right thing to do, Gaozi would not begrudge (he would be no less happy that) the elder
enjoying the meal. The standard of joy is invoked because joy, an end in itself, is ever so
contagious so that eudaemonia is to the well-being of the whole community (Lai 1984).
Even though this discourse is on yan and not on xin, it has implications for a genealogy of
morals. A man of honor like Gaozi lived for honor. Honor is social and outer; but it is the
“for-what?” that moves man to action. It is an extension of the virtue of xin (“man + word”)
except that it is not a promise made in speech to others. It is an unspoken promise made to
oneself. It is the integrity of the gentleman who vows “never to fail the world” (of honor)
—“even if the world should fail us.” The last clause is important. Because Athens was in
decline (it was politically unstable), Socrates could not count on being dealt with justly, but
still he persisted teaching despite criticism and accusation. Late Zhou was alike: the standard
of name and the decency of promised recognition (reward for virtue) were wanting, but a
Gaozi would do what a man of honor (yan) would do. In spirit, like Socrates would to Plato,
this righteous magistrate was closer to Mencius than Mencius would grant him. In substance,
there was a gulf. Gaozi accepted the system of honor of his time; Mencius, like Plato, would
dream up a better society, a more just Republic or a more benevolent King.
4 An Archaeology of Trust: Oral Oath and Written Covenant
The ideologues of xin or the philosophical school that made most of this virtue was the
Agrarians. These primitivists idealized a small-size, face-to-face, farming community ruled
over by Shennong 神農, the “Divine Peasant,” where everybody knows everybody such that
trust came all too naturally. It was a classless society since the king was himself a farmer
and his queen a weaver like most farmers’ wives. That society knew no war, no standing
army, and no use of war chariots (those and other carriages just lay around unused). Writing
having not yet been invented, there were no edicts, no instructions, no law, no incarceration
or punishment. Everything associated with recent high culture known to the men of the
Warring States period was unknown to Shennong such that this Utopia of simpletons was
dreamt up by thinkers unhappy with the evils that attended cultural advancement. Yet it is
to these Utopians we owe the picture we drew above, namely about how an ethos of speech
was overtaken by one based on name: “In former times, under Shennong there were no
restrictions or commands11 but the people followed him; [later] under Yao and Shun there
were restrictions and commands but no punishments. The House of Xia 夏 Emperor kept
their words;12 the men of Yin 殷 (Shang 商) swore oaths; the men of Chou [Zhou] made
(written13) covenants” (in Graham 1989: 67).14
11 Elsewhere, it is said neither rewards nor punishment.
12 Sometimes that virtue of xin was moved up to the Xia dynasty when people were simple and honest. With
culture came refinement but with such decor, also dishonesty.
13 In triplicates, one is sent up to heaven; one buried in earth; one pitched into the rivers.
14 Characterized elsewhere as “exercising restraint with no resort to punishment” which amounts to ruling by
rites (that restrain) and not by law (that punishes). But that is also a sign of a weak covenant
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The romantic picture above is not exactly a history of what happened, but it is not without
its ounce of poetic truth. If some face-to-face society knew pure trust, that could be just
because it is hard to lie if everybody knows everybody. Since trust usually assumes some kind
of explicit promise about getting something done, that idyllic society wherein every person
attends to his plot of land and finds little occasion to plot and plan is “trustworthy” only
because concerted actions were few and far in between. We do not usually associate “trust” as
a virtue of the family. There is surely implicit trust among family members but a family that
functions as an economic unit does not need to make verbal promise. Brothers do not need to
swear an allegiance to one another. An oath is necessary only when there is a clear distinction
between us and them, as when two different families decided to unite in marriage. A simple
marriage oath would then be sworn before the gods (a third party set above the two parties).
To enforce that contract when no other power existed to enforce it, one typically evokes a
divine sanction and for good measure, an ultimate one (death). As family-village rose to
becoming, say, Greek city states, there would evolve written legal legislation, or in the case of
China, some kind of written ritual “covenant” that would be binding. Usually by now, the city
would police itself or the feudal lords would be taking collective action against a violator of
that contract. Crucial to the transition from a sworn Oath to a written Covenant would be the
invention of writing. Although late Shang China already knew scripts, the high culture of
writing (wen as a virtue) is usually associated with the Zhou, especially with the regency of
the Duke. The Zhou covenant united a larger number of peoples than anything before, such as
the Mosaic covenant would unite the twelve tribes into a single polity.15 Such written
documents are mythopoetically “set in bronze” or “carved into stone,” those metal and rock
being a symbol of permanence. In China, the Five Classics were supposed to be “books”
compiled in early Zhou; the name “classics” means “permanent.”
If we schematize that developments for the Three Dynasties, this is the picture we
deduce from the Agrarian vision of history:
Era Soc. Stage Coherence Mode Major Virtue Gellner
Xia Family Nonverbal Trust Pu 樸, Simplicity Plough
Shang Village Formal Oral Oath Shi 實, Honesty Sword
Zhou City-State Written Covenant Wen 文, Refinement Book
The columns are constructed loosely as follows: first, three dynasties; then Aristotle’s three-
stepped evolution of society; then the Agrarian Utopians’ threefold scheme; then a trio of
virtues frequently assigned to the three dynasties; and finally, from Ernest Gellner’s book
title, plough (farmers), sword (a warrior elite), and book (classical culture) (Gellner 1988).16
It is not meant to be a perfect alignment. The ahistoricty of some of the ideal-typal
constructs should not rob them of their heuristic utility. The discussion in the last section—
on how name displaced speech—corresponds to the shift from Oath to Covenant.
Although Oath is aligned with Shang, we will get a better idea of how the dynamics of
speech and writing work if expediently we tie the oath with the War Oath sworn by the
15 If the Decalogue lists a lot of “Thou shalt not,” that is because the twelve (once separate and distinct)
tribes had each its own customs, so that it was easier to agree on what not to do than on what to do. The more
culturally unified they became later, the more the Levites could define and refine the list of the Do’s.
16 I am indebted to Andrew Huxley, in an exchange on the topic of oath, covenant and law within the
Warring States Workshop group headed by Bruce Brooks, for a lead to using the schema of Gellner here. See
WSW message archive # 3193, 3194 and 3195, 3239.
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various tribes led by King Wu 武 of Zhou in a common cause to overthrow the Shang. The
ethos of war would be the ethics of zhongxin: united devotion to the cause and mutual
reliance among comrades-in-arms, viz. “one for all and all for one.” King Wu at that point
was just “first among equals.” Only with the pacification of rule under the Duke would
zhongxin be remade into loyalty to the Son of Heaven above from all his subjects below.
The rites instituted by the Duke would ensure that, because a function of rites is to
“distinguish superior and inferior.” A written covenant often changes even the once simple
oath sworn before heaven.17 A covenant (yue 約) restrains (yue 約), which in the case of the
Zhou was accomplished by the rites. The virtue of xin changes with these modes of social
contract. In the Agrarian utopia, it was implicit: everyone helped everyone without saying a
word. At the time of the war oath, it was mutual trust and reliance while on the front-line.
At the time of the Zhou, it was hierarchic compliance. With Confucius, it was spread
laterally especially among friends. With Gaozi, it became a function of honor and living up
to a personal code of conduct. In Mencius, it would become a sincerity of intent and
truthfulness to Heaven.
5 Friendship in an Unfriendly Age: Paragons and Parodies of Xin
In the Warring States period when feudal mingwei 名位 meant nothing, when promises were
no sooner made than broken, friendship became more valued as a haven from the overt
treachery of the time. As the Zhou covenant collapsed, the oath was revived, for oath is not
just pre-covenant, it was also extra-legal.18 Warriors needed it in war. Outlaws (like the
Mafia) living outside the law inhospitable to them counted on the blood oath for self-
protection and self-policing.19 The underclass sought it out for mutual aid. Regular and
mainline society held such sworn brotherhoods suspect; the Chinese family and state
regularly warned against them. The courts of the land did not appreciate the appeal to
supernatural sanctions like “May lightning strike me if I...” either. But among the Warring
States themselves, such personal oaths and secret alliances were being cultivated. The
Zhanguo Ce 戰國策 is supposed to be about the ce 策 (strategies) of that warring period.
Tales of intrigue, their successes and failures, lent credence to this handbook on (to wit)
“how to make friends and influence people.” It mixes morality with practicality, such as
with one famous tale known as “FENG Xuan mai renyi 馮諼買仁義,” which tells of how one
can buy up renyi 仁義 (Confucian humaneness and righteousness) with cool deliberation of
its future (projected Mohist) benefit.20
From this source came the exemplary tale of xin known as the “steadfastness (xin) of
WEI Sheng 魏勝.” We do not know how or why WEI Sheng was chosen to be so lionized.
All this native of Qi did was give his word to meet this girl at a bridge. The time
came; the water rose; and the lady—as usual—was late. Refusing to move from the spot,
17 The original “Last Supper”—if that was historic—was fairly simple. It was not performed with the degree
of fanfare of the high Mass.
18 The simplest kind of social contract can be accomplished without legal rules or with minimal rites, such as
with informal “gift-exchange.”
19 The Mafia rose out of new Italian immigrant minorities not well served by the law (staffed by previous
immigrants such as the Irish); likewise the L.A. gangs would so perceive the corrupted L. A. police. Their
blood oath invokes divine sanction but by the time these outlaws grew so large as to have its own mingwei
hierarchy, and the Godfather would have hit men to administer those sanctions. Economic covenant and
political necessity may “rub out” family and kin—Hollywood style.
20 In the story, a steward to a lord “forgave the debts” peasants owed his lord, thus “sowing good will” that
provided safe haven for his lord later. See Eric Henry’s message in the WSW message archive #3021-3024.
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WEI Sheng drowned while clinging to a pillar. How much of this story is fact is hard to tell;
that is of secondary importance. Like the lives of saints, hyperbole is the rule. The drama of
what ought outweighs what is. WEI Sheng kept faith—as others did not—to a fault. If Gaozi
lived by a fairly reasonable code of honor (yan), it seems that a more excessive WEI Sheng
died somewhat needlessly for it.21
Now there is a Weisheng 微生 in Analects 5.24 (5.23 in some different editions; in
Brooks and Brooks 1998: 26). The script Wei (微 instead of 魏) is different but the lesson is
similar enough that most scholars think it is the same person. There Wei Sheng also lived
up to code. He is “upright” (generous) as the other is “steadfast.” Both point to his being
trustworthy. But here, it is about a neighbor coming to borrow a cup of vinegar. Weisheng,
caught with none would go and borrow a cup from a neighbor to comply. Generous to a
fault, he might be mocked by cynics today: it was all “borrowed generosity.” Book 29 of
the Zhuangzi 莊子, titled “Robber Zhi 盜跖,” mocked him for drowning just to make a name
for himself. Life is precious; fame is not; so it is sheer folly to trade one for the other. The
same charge can be easily filed against Gaozi if Gaozi is caricatured as one living just for
the sake of garnishing for himself a good public reputation. If so perceived, then Gaozi only
lived for name and fame.22
Below are more paraphrased stories of faithful friendship from the classical period: (1)
From SIMA Qian’s 司馬遷 Biography of GUAN Zhong 管仲: A long soap opera wherein BAO
Shuya 鮑叔牙 went out of his way to protect, connive, cajole, and shepherd GUAN Zhong to
becoming the chief minister of Qi. He even willingly served as his subordinate and for that,
he won GUAN Zhong’s admission that “no one knew me as well as (this life-long friend of
his).” For that, Bao’s descendants were in turn well provided for at Qi. People credit Bao’s
role as a patron for ensuring Zhong’s success more than they would even Zhong’s inherent
talent; (2) From the Spring and Autumn Annals Commented on by Master Lü: Harpist YU
Boyai (俞伯牙) broke his zither at the death of his friend because his friend alone could
zhiyin 知音 (recognize what his music was evoking): “He knows my heart”; (3) From SIMA
Qian’s Biography of WU Taibo 吳泰伯: Roving ambassador JI Zha 季札 had a beautiful
ceremonial sword that his host, Prince Wu, clearly liked. He needed it for his career and
could not part with it. On a return trip, finding the Prince had passed away, he hung the
sword on his grave. When asked why (the ado since the man is dead), he said, I so
promised it him in my heart (see Li 1967: 369-371).
All three stories involve being “trust and true,” but they may also reveal other
underpinnings. The first is probably told to show how, in that age of self-advancement,
office-seeking friends should help promote one another’s upward mobility. The warmth of
friendship between the pair aside, the rewards of patronage were never too far from their
mind. The second is about artists who proverbially need no words to communicate. Yin 音
(sound, music) precedes yan (speech). It being closer to the heart, he who knows the yin of
another knows well his heart.23 If the first case is rational-public, this tale is emotive-
private; one is political as the other is a mite unrealistic. The third case combines both
aspects. As a tale of patronage, JI Zha was guest as the prince was host. Etiquette would
require the guest to repay the host. Unable to part with his insignia sword, JI Zha repaid him
only at the prince’s grave—a bit belatedly. No deep friendship of the heart needs to be
21 I am indebted to the discussion on WEI Sheng within the WSW group with Bruce Brooks, Anne Kinney,
Eric Henry, Paul Goldin et al; see message archive # 2996, 3000, 3004, 3009, 3019 and passim.
22 That is how Mencians would judge Gaozi, that he was just a xiangyuan 鄉愿 (village worthy).
Shakespeare’s Mark Anthony so mocked the “honorable men” that killed Caesar too.
23 Compare this: two bridge players play a system known only to them, so when one dies, the other would
also hang up his cards for good. The two do not have to be deep friends.
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involved here. Had the prince known JI Zha well, he would have known better than to make
his desire known. Were JI Zha his confidante, the news of his death would have been
communicated to him earlier. We may never know what actually prompted JI Zha’s final
act. But hidden motives are irrelevant here; the lesson rests with the overt reason given. No
one pressured JI Zha for a parting gift. No utility is served by it either. With no public
promise made, it was a promise he made, supposedly in his heart to the prince, but it was a
promise ultimately made to himself. Mencians might read that as indicating a sincerity of
intent, but JI Zha, I trust, lived more by the standard of Gaozi.
6 The Divide between Idealist and Realist: Stoicism in the Age of the Empire
Our coverage is approaching the end of the classical period. To conclude this history of an
idea, we will trace briefly two final formulations of this virtue xin. The two could not be
more different. One is the most idealist: it sees a basic sincerity in man and reality. The
other is most realist: it has a cynical view of man and world. The first, coming from the
Mencian school, is found in the text Doctrine of the Mean. The latter is condensed in a
Legalist formula on how to get people to behave properly.
The Doctrine of the Mean has inherited the discourse on zhongshu (integrity and
reciprocity as the one thread) but reformulated that into zhongyong 中庸 (centrality and the
mean). It opens with “What heaven ordains is called human nature.” It accepts the Mencian
equation of the external Good of Heaven and the innate Good of Man. Though it voices
aphorism concerning “speech” and “promise-keeping,” it grounds morality, not in an outer
contract but in a “sincerity of intent.” It rectifies the mind more than it rectifies name or
reality. A key, new and totalistic, concept for the good in this text is cheng 誠 (“speech + to
complete”). A synonym of xin (“man + speech”) in the standard lexicons, it would
supersede xin for good in later Neo-Confucian moral discourse.
Cheng describes the good, the true, and, when completed, the beautiful (as seen in the order
of the cosmos). It links the inner and the outer, being the sincerity ofmind and good innate to the
cosmos. In a Platonic move worthy of what Gellner attributes to a meta-reflection that a book
culture made possible, sincerity in the hearts of men is in tune with the sincerity that is the
essence of reality. This is no longer the limited virtue of xin due homo politicus; it is the logia
of man being fused to a transcendental logos seeking its own completion.
xin (man + speech) what man promises in words, he would duly do
cheng (speech + complete) what Heaven gave birth to, man duly completes.
In one fundamental sense, this new ideology of sincerity is the ultimate rationalization of
the Zhou presumption of a Mandate of Heaven. What Heaven mandates or wills (as the
good) is what all moral men—not just King Wen—should bring to fruition. That historic
summon to conquest has been remade into a natural law to make right. The “naturalistic”
aspect that fuses the natural and the normative was supplied by another Zhou ideology, the
notion that Heaven also gave birth to all things. The Will of Heaven metaphorically flows
in all things. It imparts into things their individual principle (li 理: their raison d’être) and
into man their nature and reason for living (xing 性: an innate good). In that teleological
worldview, it befalls on man to “complete” what Heaven had commanded and seeded. The
telos of all things is built into their de facto existence. In this ethics grounded in Confucian
humanism, Heaven proposes, Man disposes.
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This is the apex of Mencian “moral idealism.” Its understanding of virtue so conflated
function and fruition, the given and the telos, man and thing, as well as culture and nature,
that it stood in sharp contrast to the “amoral realism” being championed by the Legalists.
Tutored by Xunzi 荀子, LI Si 李斯 and HAN Fei 韓非 kept distinct what Mencius had
conflated. Xunzi was a nominalist when it comes to the “rectification of names” for things.
He was nomic—subscribing to the standards set down by the wisdom of tradition (former
sages)—when it came to the names or norms for social living. The Legalists took their cue
from the nominalism of the former; discarded the rites that rested just on tradition; and
substituted that with the “laws of the ruler” in all political contingencies. The truth of names
is variable. An emperor can decide to call a deer a “horse” on a whim, provided that it
proves advantageous to his policy and does not harm his reputation. The power of the king
serves the ultimate source of authority. We will not go into the details of Legalist thought or
their new design on the social virtues. To show how the word xin was appropriated by
them, we need only to take up a Legalist slogan: “credible (xin) reward” but “sure (bi 必)
punishment.” Holding humans in contempt (who are basically as Freud would find them,
namely, greedy for pleasure and lazy), the Legalists deemed that the only way to mobilize a
population is to dangle reward before men so they would act in a certain way and then
threaten them with punishment if they do not. In this use of the carrot and the stick, the
carrot has to be credible but the stick is a guaranteed surety. The reason? Because people
greedy after gain fear punishment even the more. (Greed requires some effort; men are so
lazy that inertia alone might deter them from doing anything.) To exploit human weakness,
the offer of a reward should be credible enough so that people would put in enough effort
and think they could get it. They might not, but it is required that they think they could.
(Our state lottery works on that principle.) But nothing moves men more than the avowed
punishment for non-compliance. Fear would overcome any inertia and quiet any complaint.
Known for telling the ruler to “keep his words” so that laws could be enforced to the
letter and “not to change his mind too often” lest he be perceived as inconsistent, the
Legalists insisted on accountability based on task assigned. Performance (shi 實) should
accord with name (ming). But they were also ready and willing to use lies and deceit to
get things done. The end justifies the means. LI Si 李斯 even plotted the death of fellow
student and Legalist HAN Fei 韓非, which is not an act that would inspire much trust. The
idealist and the realist positions described above seem to be polar opposites, but their
currency actually went hand in hand in their time. The Legalists helped to build the first
Empire in China but in the process left many moralists feeling adrift in the new mass
society, now the Empire loomed so large as to appear inhospitable and alienating. Empires
also rose in the Hellenistic world, and the Stoics learned to adjust to the new situation.
They accepted the relativity of nomos (law) that went with different polis, city states.
Those states being not absorbed under the Empire, the Stoics counted on the logos of their
mind to ground itself in the logos of the cosmos.24 They were the first cosmopolitans, at
home in the larger universe than that of the political state. Although the Da Xue 大學
(Great Learning) claims to bridge the gap between family and state—there being no real
tradition of the polis in China prior to the rise of the Empire—the Doctrine of the Mean
provided what seems to be the same Stoic comfort. It found an “inner” sincerity that is
one with the Sincerity of Heaven and Earth.25 Less outgoing than a Seneca and less
24 Note that “free will” is not set against “necessity” here, for like logos would to physis, freedom here is
being tuned to nature.
25 Sincere intent should not be read as the Kantian good will. It is more like the virtue of conscentiousness.
Mencius still lived in a ritually defined universe.
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geared for battle compared with a Marcus Aurelius, the gentleman of this text who so
prized solitude seems to rest contented that he could know the affairs of the world without
ever leaving his room. What that says of the inner kingdom of nature and mind is best left
for speculation.26 Our coverage will end here but for an appendix [optional].
7 The Extension of Trust and the Limit to Sociability: The Cretan Liar
The brief history of the concept of xin above is meant to be party to a study in virtue ethics.
It assumes that virtues create the kind of good society that a community hopes to live up to.
It follows that the list of virtues would change in time as society change—and vice versa. In
the larger scheme of things, modernity with its modernist ethics that repealed classical and
medieval virtue ethics ended up with a list of virtues (so to say) that was supposed to create
a new kind of society it hoped would be good. The “good society” seems however to be
elusive and in post-modern retrospect, virtue ethicists begin to question the feasibility of its
claims and the justice of its assumptions. So how may classical China’s virtue ethics speak
to us today across the chasm of time?
The problem that faced classical society seems to be not that different from those facing
modern society, or so our retrieval of that history might show. The virtue of xin had
changed during that classical span of time, as may be summarized below:
Shang Zhou Uprising Zhou Rule Chaos & Empire
1. Pragmatic oath
of word/deed
2. Ideal of moral King
appointed by moral Heaven
3. Prescriptive covenant
of title and rank
4. Mencian idealism hand in
hand with Legalist realism
As tied to speech, xin was originally the virtue of deed matching word or promise-keeping.
Its performance in (1) was specific and particularistic (reliant on whom and for what end?).
It was not yet a generalizable and universal virtue. Tied to pledges between man and man, it
found its highest expression (one drawing in the larger number of people) quite naturally in
the formation of a new political entity. Xin thus underwrote in (2) the confederation of tribes
that sworn to a war Oath that brought an ailing Shang dynasty down. In war, one kept faith
(xin) with one’s allies and not trusting the enemy, used one’s wits and wiles to deceive and
defeat the foe. Being truthful or honest did not mean not lying always. The Zhou campaign
was however inspired by a higher ideal than a limited ethos, to use a Nazi-revived term, of
“blood (lineage) and soil (locality).” The right to rule now involves a transferable Mandate
from a moral Heaven which is impartial. In theory and in time, the Mandate would be open
26 The issue is too large to deal with here. China did not draw the homology Plato drew between the self and
the state. Plato’s tripartite soul informs the make-up of the Republic with its wise philosopher, its courageous
guardians, and its temperate producers. Mencius knew only elite who use their mind and commoners who
slave with their muscles. The standard homology is that the ruler is the mind-heart and the officials are the
five organs (wuguan 五官 has that double entendre). But the Greek citizens legislated and the Roman senate
drew up laws for a mixed population living together. China pitted familial moral rites against imperial
immoral law. Confucian ritualists trusted not law but a politics of good manners: teach the non-Han people
the proper deportment and they would become willing Han subjects. French state-craft under Louis XIV also
trusted a civilizing by good manners as the court worked to make civil the uncouth warrior nobility. No more
private duels and private feuds, no more oaths sworn before local saints, not when there was the religion
royale of one Saint Louis for all regions under his reign (more if we count the pious but costly Crusades that
were for Christendom more than for France).
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to all men under Heaven as to end up in the Mencian idealism of the Doctrine of the Mean
(as registered in the diagram above).
That transformation came about by way, initially, of (3). The Duke of Zhou consolidated
rule by way of rites and music, replacing a war Oath with a Covenant of peace. It
superimposed the status ethics of “title and rank” over the performative ethics of “words
and deeds.” This became the foundation of Confucian mingjiao 名教; the theory of
“rectification of names” would expect performance of ascribed role up to the ideal of code.
However, because within the five human relationships, that among friends was most open
and free, voluntaristic and non-scripted, it preserved and promoted a virtue of mutual trust
and mutual edification best. When Confucius opened up the status of ren (nobility) to all
men and made it into the highest good, he also set the pace for xin to become the
foundational virtue for all social life. If ren was no longer tied to a class, xin was likewise
unanchored from any one goal of any particular community. The philosopher-king in
Plato’s Republic might have to have the requisite of wisdom, but everyone, the king, the
guardians, and the producers, would have to observe alike the honesty of not lying for no
communal life is possible if people cannot be truthful. Now xin covers but means more than
honesty; as sincerity, it would also connote concern.
Now if Confucius so assumed that truthfulness and humaneness are requisite of all
humanity, then Mozi 墨子 would be the one to bring those two virtues together in his call to
“loving all men” equally and truthfully. Mohists would love even strangers, those people
“behind the wall,” viz. unseen or unknown to us.27 But if classical humanism reached its
maximal extension here, it would also run into an ethico-logical problem: the limit of
sociability. This may best be illustrated with a new reading of the Cretan Liar in Greek
thought.28
Ephimenides was a Cretan who lived in the sixth century BCE who reportedly
remarked that all Cretans were liars. Since he was himself a Cretan, how is one to read
that statement? If true, then the fact that he made that statement would prove how not all
Cretans lie. Books, I have been told, have been written on how to solve this logical
impasse. A genealogy of morals would see it as something more than a logical problem.
The issue is more so moral and political. Since Crete was Myceanean, racially speaking
Ephimenides would not be Greek or Indo-Aryan. Being non-Aryan (aryan means noble),
he would at one time not be counted as “noble” or in Chinese, ren. Let us suppose
Ephimenides had slipped past a Greek border guard posted at the border to wean out
illegal immigrants. He passed through customs by appeasing the guard, namely, repeating
a racist slur that “all Cretans are liars.” Suppose, like a present-day Mexican named Jose
Ephimenides who later became a naturalized citizen of the United States, this Cretan was
accepted later as a naturalized Greek citizen (he was accepted and respected in the
enlightened forum of the polis), should he then be deported for initially entering the
country under false pretenses (by lying to that INS official)? If this is an issue of logic,
then indeed the Immigration and Naturalization Service would have a hard time proving
that lie. But if we deconstruct this incident as an “Uncle Tom” story, the fault is not with
his attempted appeasement of the border guard’s bigotry; the untruth lies in that racist slur
27 Morality is a matter of Logic to Mozi, but the Sophists would use that against him. GONGSUN Long 公孫龍
of the “white horse not horse” fame argued that since to love and benefit X involves disprivileging non-X,
loving all (with none to disprivilege) is loving none. HUI Shi 惠施, noting how categories are indiscreet (“a
white dog is black”), would love all things—and not benefit man in particular.
28 I owe references to Ephimenidea to discussions in the WSW; see message archive # 3069, 3071, 3073,
3014, 3015, 3016, especially by Anne Kinney, Douglas Hendersen, and Huan Saussy.
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born of a one-time Aryancentrism. It was a problem that came with the Greek
Enlightenment and the birth of Humanism among the classical thinkers who came to
extend “nobility” to all men—Greeks and Cretans alike. Whereas at one time, Greeks
only trusted Greeks and considered all Cretan liars (like some bigots would still say
“Mexican low life”), the classical thinkers had come around to see that the virtue of
honesty was due all humans and not the monopoly of the Aryans.
In other words, the case of the Cretan Liar posted not so much a timeless challenge to a
Greek mind ruled by logic. When it became a topic of philosophical conversation is when
classical society learned to accept a truth about our common humanity, that we should treat
all men as being equally trustworthy and true. At a time when the United States which once
welcomed the poor and the wretched to its shores is now rethinking its immigration policy,
the issue of the Cretan Liar is more than academic. Back then in classical China, the Neo-
Mohist ethicists were tested with a similar problem. If humanity is infinite, can we love so
infinitely? (Since Mohists believe in dividing benefits equally, the problem is how to divide
anything into infinite portions.) The Neo-Mohists came up with a solution that would not
pass muster among logicians today.29 But similar to what we said above of the Cretan Liar,
it is not the head but the heart that counts in the moral side of that discourse. If elsewhere
the Mohists could count the harm and benefits and declare, not so lovingly, that killing
Robber Zhi—the legendary marauder who pillaged and plundered and never did anyone
any good—is not killing a man, we have a foretaste of the limit of sociability that even an
avowed “lover of all men” would admit. Like Bin Laden, the robber as persona non grata
is being reclassified as a non-person. Killing him is not killing a man. The political realism
of the Legalist is making its presence felt here. But then in step with the Mohists, the
Mencian answers about people rising up and deposing a tyrant is that he heard a tyrant
being deposed—he did not hear of a king being killed. (Regicide is against the code of
ritual names.) As virtue ethics confronted those issues back then, we do so again today. And
in the end, the criterion has to be the picture of the good society that virtues help to inscribe
and/or the justice ethics, modern or traditional, seeks to actualize.
Acknowledgement The essay is prepared with invaluable assistance from Professor CHENG Yu-yin of
Manhatten Marymount College.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix: The Robber Zhi Chapter
WEI Sheng, the paragon of xin who willingly drowned just to keep a date, was mocked by
the author of the “Robber Zhi” chapter in the Zhuangzi. The criticism was embedded in a
long Primitivist diatribe indicting the evils wrought by sage-kings and high culture in
general. The writer had conjured up a fictive exchange between Confucius representing
high morals and the legendary Robber Zhi who stood for “public enemy number one.”
Confucius, who lectured the robber on virtue, ended up being soundly lectured by the
robber instead. Although the discourse has only incidental bearing on our topic of xin, it
29 Can one divide finite goods among an infinite count of humanity? Yes. Draw an imaginary circle for the
infinite and put all humanity inside it. If it fills the circle, humanity has a limit; if it does not fill the circle,
humanity also has a limit.
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does touch on the genealogy of morals or how the ethics of conquest is not the ethics of
rule.
Confucius in this chapter is the defender of rule trying to change the ways of Robber Zhi
who was terrorizing the feudal lords with his mighty, roving band of thieves, living the code
of a marauder. Confucius began by retelling a hierarchy of three virtues:
To grow up tall and big, to be perfectly handsome and good, to please everyone that
sees him, be they young or old, honored or lowly—this is to have superior virtue. To
have knowledge that ties together heaven and earth, to be able to dispute on all
manners of things—that is to have middling virtue. To be brave and bold, to be
decisive and daring, to gather in multitude and lead on troops—this is to have inferior
virtue. Whoever has one of these virtues is capable of facing south [rule as Shun did]
and style himself ‘solitary’ [an attribute solely of the king]. (Victor Mair 1994: 300)
Though not specifically named, the trio of virtues corresponds to the set of ren, zhi 智, and
yong 勇(nobility, wisdom, and courage, better remembered in the sequence of wisdom,
nobility, and courage). By that account, the robber has only raw courage, the lowest of the
three. But that was enough to make the marauder a king. Ever so diplomatic, Confucius
actually showered the robber with possessing all three virtues—only to hedge that praise by
noting the bad reputation Zhi had garnished for himself:
Now you, general, are someone who combines all three. Your person is eight feet two
inches tall, your face is radiant, your lips are like shining cinnabar, your teeth are like
even cowry shells, your voice is like the Yellow Bell, and yet you are named Robber
Footpad. I must admit, general, that I am ashamed for you and cannot approve of this.
(Victor Mair 1994: 301)
Confucius then offered to be his ambassador and initiate what we will nowadays call a PR
(public relations) campaign. That would amount to, in the proper parlance, a “rectification
of name.” The purpose is to remake the “robber” into “king” or at least a respectable
“feudal lord” among the feudal lords he was terrorizing. That would then turn marauder
(read “conqueror”) into emperor (read “ruler”). This being a late chapter suspected to have
been composed in early Han, the historical context would be the rise of “banditry” (peasant
rebellion) that brought the Qin 秦 down but which, ending with one such bandit coming to
the throne as the Han emperor, meant a recasting of a “bandit” into a “king.”
Speaking on behalf of a culture of peace succeeding the chaos of war, Confucius then
recommended to Robber Zhi that he should “disband [his] troops and demobilize [his]
soldiers.” Now if Confucius was rehearsing the role of the Duke of Zhou, that would mean
a consolidating of rule by instituting a reign based on “music and rites.” That offer from the
Master—realized later in Han history by DONG Zhongshu 董仲舒 under Han Emperor Wu—
was pretext enough for Robber Zhi to launch into an angry disputation, one involving a
Primitivist condemnation of high culture, everything from the quest for fame (name) and
gain (benefit) to government under sage-kings (whose wisdom wrought only folly). The
Robber called for a repeal of wen (writing) and a return to a simple, preliterate, agrarian
society. His speech ended on a Yangist note. With human beings given such a short life
span in a cosmos so infinite, they would do better safeguarding what was given them than
cut short their lives with all this needless hustling and bustling. That was the final message
of the author of this chapter who fashioned this pretext of a fabled exchange so he might air
his judgment on the times.
But authors do not create texts ex nihilo; they inherit and retell tales that as pre-texts
might create sub-texts of their own. In the story, Confucius exaggerated the Robber’s
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virtues. The Robber might have the raw courage of a marauder but hardly the nobility or the
wisdom deemed proper for a true king. In the story, the author has the Robber repudiating
all such cultured benevolence and gentlemanly prudence as inauthentic garnishment. Yet
the author himself overlooked the description of the Robber’s gabled stature, beauty, and
popularity. Those attributes, by a Nietzschean reading, show the Robber to be in actual full
possession of those three virtues. How?
Virtue, says Nietzsche, at one time meant Power. Nobility then went with a warrior elite.
Ren, by that token, described once the highborn, who naturally “grow up tall and big, to be
perfectly handsome and good, and to please everyone that sees him, be they young or old,
honored or lowly.” Just like the gods and heroes that fought on both sides of the war in
Homer’s Iliad, none of those noble souls was ever short, ugly, or awful to behold. It may be
sheer hubris but that (and other) ruling elite always think they were beloved by high and
low alike. And although highborns could not be genetically predisposed to look “tall and
handsome,” that perception was as ingrained as the underclass (and a potential traitor like
Brutus) would wear a “lean and hungry look.” Are all “sons of warrior lords” born
proverbially courageous? Scientifically speaking, no. But warrior societies would work to
ensure, as Sparta did, the survival of those fit for war. (Nomads and hunters had no need to
observe primogeniture; they choose the more able to lead them. Giving the first born a
natural primacy is a luxury of the idle rich. A land-owning elite could be born short, fat, and
ugly and still live off the fat of his land and the labor of others by relying on deputized
rule.) By that warrior standard, a strong man like Robber Zhi who could rally men behind
him would be deemed “tall and handsome” (as Attila the Hun would to his followers). And
if he could be “daring and decisive” in battle, he would earn the kudos of possessing
strategic wisdom (as CAO Cao 曹操 of the Three Kingdoms did). Since Robber Zhi was able
to “gather in multitude and lead on troops,” he may presume that virtue. Of course, in the
story, Confucius who offered his own “wise counsel” to aid the robber, had a different idea
of what constitute true wisdom. To him, it meant the “knowledge that ties together heaven
and earth” and the ability “to dispute on all manners of things.” The latter was the trademark
of philosophers; the former was the promise of ZOU Yan 鄒衍, that he could assure a
conqueror a cosmological justification for a destined rule. At the time when this chapter of
composed, the author could be seeking to offer his “Daoist” philosophy to a potential
(“bandit”) claimant to the throne, but that is a separate story better left to more skillful
scholars in the field.30
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